The fund would be governed by an independent body and be independent of electoral politics and political faction. Much of the political infrastructure required is already in place as it maps onto the independent structure of the patent office and other governance designs that have been proposed in the past such as the Health Impact Fund (HIF).
In order to represent a viable alternative to the patent system, remuneration rights must be politically feasible. Fortunately, much of the political infrastructure required for a remuneration rights system is already in place, including the fund’s governance structure and the relationship between the fund and governments. This means there are few significant barriers to a transition to a remuneration rights system.
The fund would be governed by an independent body. Stakeholder participation would be important to ensure that all states are willing to join the remuneration rights fund.1 Transparency would also be vital, to create trust in the operating of the fund. Ultimately, the most important feature of the governing body would be its impartiality. One way of achieving this would be to make governance independent of electoral politics and political faction. Another might be to separate the performance of health impact assessment from the establishment of guidelines for the same.2 This would minimise the discretionary function of health impact assessment and reduce the risk of external influence being exerted.
Specific governance designs have already been proposed by previous proposals operating along similar lines to a remuneration rights fund, see White Paper, section 5.2.2. Our proposal builds upon these previous models. Such designs would need to be considered carefully in a feasibility study.
We have also considered the issue of international cooperation, see White Paper section 5.2.3.
